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O<\/span>n Sunday, Hungarians will go to the polls to decide on their country\u2019s direction for the next four years in an election that looks as if it will be a nail-biter. Viktor Orb\u00e1n, Europe\u2019s longest-serving prime minister \u2013 who has been in power for 16 years and transformed his country into an electoral autocracy \u2013 could lose the election<\/a>. Ahead of the vote, EU officials have high expectations for change in Hungary under a potential new leadership. Politico reported that \u201cthe Brussels establishment is praying for [P\u00e9ter] Magyar to win, hoping a Tisza government will deepen ties with the EU<\/a>\u201d.<\/p>\n Magyar became a trailblazer when he entered the Hungarian political scene<\/a> in 2024 after a political scandal<\/a> implicating the former president Katalin Nov\u00e1k and the minister of justice, Magyar\u2019s ex-wife, Judit Varga. By addressing the socioeconomic concerns of ordinary Hungarians, politicising the run-down healthcare and education systems and highlighting the country\u2019s deteriorating economic situation and corrupt government practices, Magyar has steadily risen in the polls.<\/p>\n And yet while an electoral victory for <\/strong>his Tisza party seems within reach, less than a week before the election observers should not set their expectations too high for the election outcome \u2013 or for Magyar\u2019s prospects were he to become <\/strong>Hungary\u2019s new prime minister.<\/p>\n First, although all independent pollsters show Magyar and his Tisza party clearly ahead<\/a> of Fidesz, the prospect of him actually winning the election remains uncertain. While the elections are free, they are unfair, as Orb\u00e1n has tilted the electoral playing field<\/a> in his favour over the years, creating an unfair advantage. Measures include repeated gerrymandering, adding \u201cwinner compensation\u201d to benefit the strongest party in the districts and granting Hungarian minorities abroad, who are overwhelmingly Fidesz supporters, the right to vote. In addition, investigations have uncovered<\/a> systematic electoral fraud, including chain voting, voter buying and intimidation, particularly in Hungary\u2019s poorest regions.<\/p>\n Under these circumstances, it remains unclear whether Tisza\u2019s votes will translate into a parliamentary majority, let alone a constitutional majority. Crucially, without a two-thirds majority in parliament it will be near impossible to dismantle the Orb\u00e1n regime. Over the past 16 years, Fidesz has entrenched its ideas and personnel into Hungary\u2019s political <\/strong>system through cardinal laws that require a supermajority to change or abolish them.<\/p>\n Bringing Hungary back into the fold of electoral democracies would require replacing the Fidesz loyalists who are constitutional court judges and heads of key public institutions, such as <\/strong>the prosecutor general and the chair <\/strong>of the media authority. Making matters worse, Hungary\u2019s president, Tam\u00e1s Sulyok, elected by parliament, is another Fidesz loyalist who would ordinarily remain in office until 2029. While the president\u2019s role is largely ceremonial, Fidesz has recently passed a bill reinforcing it, possibly in anticipation of being ousted from power in the elections. The president could thus present another obstacle to a Tisza government by sending legislation back or referring it to the Fidesz-packed constitutional court for review.<\/p>\n Given these circumstances, a situation could arise similar to that in Poland when the Law and Justice party (PiS) lost the 2023 elections. After defeating the radical right party, <\/strong>prime minister Donald Tusk was accused of resorting to unlawful means<\/a> to restore democracy, drawing criticism from legal scholars. In a concerning portent for Hungarian democrats, since the election of PiS candidate Karol Nawrocki as president last year, he has regularly obstructed Tusk\u2019s government by vetoing essential legislation, including a recent judicial reform<\/a> that was part of the government\u2019s rule-of-law agenda.<\/p>\n A new Hungarian government would face similar obstacles, but an even steeper uphill battle. After 16 years in power, twice as long as PiS in Poland, Fidesz is much more entrenched in the state than PiS ever was, making a return to the status quo ante even more challenging.<\/p>\n Even if Tisza\u2019s vote share translates into a majority in parliament and enables it to implement reforms, democrats should not expect too much from a Magyar government. The leader of the opposition comes <\/strong>from a conservative family and was <\/strong>a member of Fidesz for more than two decades \u2013 he spent years working for the Orb\u00e1n regime and is clearly ideologically aligned with his former party.<\/p>\n In fact, some preliminary analyses<\/a> of Tisza\u2019s voting patterns in the European parliament suggest that the party mostly aligns with Fidesz, especially on immigration and Ukraine. While this could be tactical, given the sensitivity of these issues in Hungarian political discourse, Tisza\u2019s party programme also vows to reject the EU\u2019s migrant pact and quotas and to oppose Ukraine\u2019s accelerated accession to the EU. So even though Tisza will undoubtedly be a more constructive force in its relations with European partners, some fundamental disagreements will remain.<\/p>\n Finally, although Tisza\u2019s voter base mainly comprises liberal and leftwing voters<\/a>, progressives should not get their hopes up for a swift transition to liberal democracy in Hungary. According to recent polling<\/a>, the new parliament will be made up solely of rightwing parties: the rightwing Tisza, the far-right Fidesz and potentially the extreme-right Our Homeland Movement. Magyar, while generally claiming to support equality<\/a>, has so far avoided taking a clear supportive stance on some core ideological issues, such as LGBTQ+ rights. While this could also be part of a strategic approach to avoid offering Fidesz any vulnerabilities it could exploit for its propaganda, it is also in line with his political history and the rightwing nature of his party\u2019s programme.<\/p>\n Considering the challenges Magyar will encounter if he is elected, not to mention his own rightwing ideology, it seems unlikely that <\/strong>he would prioritise restoring liberal democracy to Hungary beyond trying to undo 16 years of Orb\u00e1nism. Progressives and democrats need to manage their expectations ahead of Sunday\u2019s vote. As it stands, the best case scenario for Hungary is a return to electoral<\/em> democracy under a Magyar government. Liberal democracy, however, will probably remain out of reach for now.<\/p>\n Gabriela Greilinger is a PhD student at the University of Georgia; Cas Mudde is the Stanley Wade Shelton UGAF professor of international affairs at the University of Georgia and author of The Far Right Today<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n\n