For decades, the member states of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) have maintained close economic and diplomatic ties with partners such as France, China, the United States and the European Union. These relationships continue to structure the region’s external engagement, particularly in infrastructure, finance, and trade. Yet shifts in the global political economy are gradually reshaping this landscape, with emerging actors expanding their presence across Africa and contributing to a more diversified cooperation environment.
Central African governments have increasingly embraced this diversification strategy, seeking new partnerships beyond their traditional interlocutors. Within this context, the United Arab Emirates has emerged as a visible – though still relatively modest – economic partner. Through investments in logistics, energy projects, and trade frameworks, Abu Dhabi appears to be deepening its engagement in Central Africa, reflecting a broader strategy to expand its economic footprint across the continent.
At the same time, these developments raise important questions. To what extent does the UAE represent a transformative partner for CEMAC economies? Or does its presence simply add another actor to an already crowded ecosystem of external partners competing for influence and commercial opportunities?
Diplomatic exchanges reflecting diversification
Historically, diplomatic outreach from Central African leaders has focused on capitals such as Paris, Washington, Brussels, and Beijing. In recent years, visits to the UAE have reportedly become more frequent. Leaders including Faustin-Archange Touadéra of the Central African Republic, Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno of Chad, Brice Oligui Nguema of Gabon, and Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of the Congo have all undertaken high-level visits to the country.
These exchanges have been accompanied by Emirati business delegations travelling to the region, notably to Chad and Gabon in 2025. According to official announcements, the UAE also committed USD 6.2 billion in November 2025 to support Chad’s national development strategy, suggesting that the relationship may be evolving beyond diplomatic dialogue towards financial cooperation.
For CEMAC governments, diversification offers a way to broaden their network of partners and attract additional investment. Yet the durability of this engagement remains uncertain. Some analysts suggest that geopolitical tensions in the Middle East could eventually redirect Emirati attention and resources closer to home.. If so, could Central African states once again find themselves reliant on a narrower set of external partners?
Logistics and connectivity as central pillars of engagement
Emirati engagement in Central Africa has so far concentrated largely on logistics and transport infrastructure – sectors widely viewed as critical constraints on regional trade.
In 2023, AD Ports Group signed a thirty-year concession to manage and operate the port of Pointe-Noire in the Republic of the Congo, reportedly including a USD 500 million commitment. As one of Central Africa’s main maritime gateways, the port plays a significant role in regional trade flows.
A second concession followed in February 2026, when AD Ports Group secured the right to operate the dry bulk terminal at the Douala Autonomous Port in Cameroon, with an investment estimated at around EUR 73.4 million. Emirati entities have also reportedly expressed interest in the development of Gabon’s planned deep-sea port at Mayumba.
Transport connectivity projects have also attracted attention. In May 2025, Etihad Rail signed a memorandum of understanding with Chad’s National Railway Office to update feasibility studies for a proposed 800-kilometre railway linking N’Djamena to Ngaoundéré in Cameroon. If realised, the project would connect Chad more directly to the port of Douala.
Energy cooperation and trade frameworks
Energy cooperation has also become a visible component of the relationship. In November 2025, Global South Utilities Power reportedly agreed to develop a 180-MW solar power plant in Chad, with an estimated investment of USD 350 million. The project allegedly forms part of a broader package that includes support for a thermal power plant in N’Djamena and smaller solar installations led by the local company Tchadelec.
In the Central African Republic, construction began in August 2025 on a solar project near Bangui with a planned capacity of around 60 MW. In the Republic of the Congo, AMEA Power signed a memorandum of understanding in 2024 to develop a 100-MW solar plant as part of plans to increase national electricity generation to 1,500 MW by 2030. Discussions have also reportedly taken place in Gabon regarding the revival of the stalled Oyem solar plant project.
Alongside these investments, trade agreements are becoming more prominent. Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements have been discussed or signed with several countries in the region, including Gabon, the Republic of the Congo, the C.A.R, and Chad. While these frameworks could expand commercial exchange, some observers question whether the benefits will be evenly distributed, as previous tariff-free initiatives with major partners have often coincided with persistent trade deficits for African economies.
Political risk and strategic positioning
Despite increasing engagement, CEMAC remains one of the continent’s most politically fragile regions. Chad and Gabon have recently experienced military coups, the CAR continues to face conflict, and several countries – including Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Congo – are governed by long-standing leaders without clearly articulated succession plans.
Such dynamics raise questions about the stability of investment frameworks in the event of political transition. At the same time, the UAE’s willingness to pursue projects in these environments may reflect a distinctive investment approach. Unlike some Gulf counterparts – such as Saudi Arabia or Qatar, whose African strategies have often prioritised more stable markets – Emirati actors appear more willing to operate in complex political contexts.
A complementary rather than transformative partner
Overall, the UAE’s engagement with CEMAC appears to be gradually expanding, particularly in logistics, energy, and trade facilitation. Yet its footprint remains limited compared with long-established partners whose historical, financial, and diplomatic ties continue to shape the region’s external relations.
In this sense, Abu Dhabi may be emerging less as a replacement for traditional actors than as an additional node within an increasingly diversified network of external partners. Whether this relationship will ultimately transform Central Africa’s development trajectory – or simply reinforce existing economic patterns – remains an open question.
